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1.1 Background and motivation 
 
Automobiles these days are no longer mechanical tools; they are embedded computers 
running on wheels. The high demand of technologies by the consumers is pushing them 
to be more computerized each day. Nearly hundred percent of new cars have wireless 
technologies that are vulnerable to intrusion and lack privacy measures (Markey 2015, 
3). The new technologies in cars are lucrative to use, they brought a large number of 
technological processes together and as a result opened numerous attack surfaces. Car 
security research gained a significant number of public attentions because most of the 
people owns a car and has clear idea of the damage it can cause if not functioned properly 
(Miller & Valasek 2015, 5). It is indeed a huge risk if a situation arises where a high speed 
car loses its brakes due to intrusions and alterations. A majority of the auto manufactures 
are unaware of such vulnerabilities and could not recall any hacking attempt in the past. 
Nevertheless they are collecting vast amount of data on car performance and driving his-
tory in order to improve the customer experience (Markey 2015, 14). 
Since the invention of automobiles, cars were mere mechanical devices for almost eighty 
years, until sophisticated technologies are integrated to them (Koscher 2014, 26-29). Day 
by day the complexity grew and now it is believed that a recent car has an average of 100 
million lines of software code (Charette 2009).  According to Alfred Katzenbach, the di-
rector of IT management in Daimler, the radio and telematics of Mercedes Benz itself has 
more than 20 million lines of code. In this midst of codes, lie unknown vulnerabilities. 
The number of functionalities in automobile systems allows user to connect various de-
vices such as mobile phones and iPods via networking technologies such as Wi-Fi, Blue-
tooth or near field communication (NFC). On top of that, it is also possible to connect a 
car to the cellular systems to get navigation data and even software updates. Tesla Motors 
already introduced a feature called Over-The-Air update where a user can connect his/her 
car to the home wireless network and is able to download any software update via the 
interaction module on the dashboard. When an update is available for a specific model of 
car, the center display will give the option to download it now or later. (Software updates 
Tesla Motors 2015.)  
The tragic death of American journalist Michael Hastings in 2013 also brings back a lot 
of questions. Michael was killed in a car crash in California and there are many conspiracy 
theories behind his accident. Former counterterrorism adviser Richard Clarke mentioned 
that the attack might be an automobile cyber-attack and a similar demonstration was con-
ducted by Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in the United States. 
This was followed by the security and privacy report issued from the Senator Ed Markey's 
office and it was clear that the "Drivers are at risk". (Papenfuss 2015.) Although it was 
not confirmed that if Michael's car was actually hacked or not for the crash, but it shows 
that there is enough attack surface and opportunities for intruders to damage an automo-
bile's infrastructure and anybody’s fate can be like Michael if the attack surfaces are not 
mitigated properly. These attack surfaces and privacy findings motivated the author to 
perform his research on this area.  
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1.2 Research Gap 
 
Comparing to other research areas in information systems, automobile vulnerabilities and 
privacies are a very new branch. Not many works have been done in the past and hence 
there is an ample rooms for research and development. The three most common areas 
which can be overlapped with this research topic are: 
1. Consumer’s privacy scale and model 
2. Vulnerability analysis (including penetration testing) in automobile and embed-
ded systems and  
3. Possible solutions to mitigate the vulnerabilities in automobile systems. 
This research looks into the vulnerabilities in automobile systems and analyses its attack 
surfaces. In addition to that, it seeks if the automobile consumer’s privacy fits into any 
privacy scale and model. No work has been done yet in this topic and hence it elevates a 
research gap in the literature.      
 








1.3 Study aim and research question 
 
This thesis studies the attack surfaces in an automotive system and seeks to find a proper 
privacy scale and/or model for the automotive consumer privacy. Measuring privacy is 
always been a difficult job in digital world as entities can be copied and reused several 
times, like in physical world. As for an example, a paper money is one entity and it holds 
its values which is related to one object. Whereas if there is a lack of regulatory bodies 
(or public ledger) for Bitcoins, it can be used many times with a same entity and value 
(Murphy – Murphy – Seitzinger 2015). On top of that public awareness towards consumer 
privacy has developed very recently. The below diagram about the level of knowledge of 
privacy rights among Canadians gives a good idea about other developed countries as 
well. It can be seen that in 2001 the good and very good knowledge of privacy rights were 
only 13% combined which is about 33% combined in 2014. 
 
Figure 2 Level of knowledge of privacy rights among Canadians from 2001 till 
2014 (2014 Survey of Canadians on Privacy) 
 
The research questions this thesis is aim to study are: 
1. What are the attack surfaces and methods in automotive systems and network? 
How many of them are currently used by automotive consumers? (R1) 
2. In which consumer’s privacy scale and/or model do automotive consumer privacy 
falls? (R2) 
 
This study is divided into two parts, the first part does an extensive research to answer R1 
and the second part tried to tailor a known privacy scale model to match the automotive 
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consumer privacy preferences. An internet based survey was conducted using Google 
forms and 142 respondents were recorded. 20 questions were asked among the audiences 
and almost half of the questions were focused on the different technologies and appliances 
used by the consumers which have an attack surface. The rest of the questions were re-
lated to privacy in connected cars and were intended to match a known consumer privacy 
scale model.  
 
 
1.4 Research limitation and scope 
Automotive cybersecurity is a vast field with major opportunities to research. There can 
be a number of subcategories where the concentration could be given. But due to the time 
and resource limitation, the scope of this research has been determined.  
This research has only performed a theoretical studies about the attack surfaces in an 
automotive network. Concentration and priorities has been given to controller area net-
work or CAN Bus architecture as it is one of the most common one in cars today. CAN 
bus is a vehicle bus network that is used by the microcontrollers and devices to communi-
cate to each other. No practical experiments has been done with the components of the 
cars. The privacy discussed in this research are solely consumer’s privacy which are ex-
posed (or maybe exposed) due to connected cars. Although the privacy part of this re-
search has been tailored with the Internet Users' Information Privacy Concerns (IUIPC) 
privacy scale (Malhotra – Kim – Agarwal 2004) but the covariates of the original scales 
such as Sex, age, education, internet experiences are not included in this research. Alt-
hough the solutions of automotive cybersecurity are touched briefly but only the attack 
surfaces, methods and privacy in connected cars are mostly discussed.        
  
1.5 Research strategy and structure 
A strategy is “a method or plan chosen to bring about a desired future, such as achieve-
ment of a goal or solution to a problem” (Business Dictionary 2015). It is the step by step 
plan to reach to a goal of fulfilling something. The strategy of this research is to study the 
attack surfaces and methods of automotive systems and infrastructure. After that, match 
the existing IUIPC consumer’s privacy scale model with the privacy concern of the auto-
motive consumers. Side by side there was a survey questionnaire to analyse and support 
the research. 
The original IUIPC scale model was modified little bit to support the findings of this 
research. The covariates were excluded as they were the limitations of data collections. 
Besides that, the survey questionnaires are based on 5-point scale instead of original 7-




Figure 3 The modified IUIPC scale from the original (Malhotra et al 2004) 
 
The hypotheses of original IUIPC scale model have also been altered to fit the consumers’ 
privacy in automotive securities. Modification are made to tailor the original IUIPC 
model to blend with the privacy concerns of automotive consumers. The main modifica-
tions are changing the generalized “Internet users” to “Automotive users” and “market-
ers” to “automotive manufacturers and third parties”.  The IUIPC scale model is a good 
for this study because the hypotheses and privacy concerns in IUIPC are similar to the 






1.5.1 Research methods 
 
The study of information system is a comparatively new field of applied science, it was 
only emerged in 1960s (Myers – Avison 2002). The substantial growth of information 
systems in the last half century has opened a lots of rooms for new researches and devel-
opments. Choosing a research method is indeed one of the most important factors for 
applied science researches (Bhattacherjee 2012). A proper research methods are needed 
that is well structured and has suitable ways for data analysis. The main two types of 
research analysis are Quantitative and Qualitative researches. The quantitative research 
analysis mostly deals with numbers, frequencies and try to figure out the quantitative 
value out of a system. It is a statistically reliable results which can be generalizable as 
well. A problem is viewed and quantified according to the analyzed data. On the other 
hand, qualitative research analysis mostly focused on the quality of the data and depends 
on exploratory research. The insight of an applied issue is studied in order to uncover 
social and cultural phenomena (Pickard 2012). The philosophical perspective of qualita-
tive research is the "assumption of knowledge and how it can be obtained" (Myers et al 
2002). Generally hypotheses are assumed and studies are done to conclude in either ac-
cepting or rejecting the hypotheses. There are many philosophical perspective of qualita-
tive researches, one of them is Positivist research. Positivist research usually assume that 
"reality is objectively given and can be described by measurable properties which are 
independent of the observer (researcher) and his or her instruments." (Myers et al 2002). 
Hypothesis 1: Automotive users’ information privacy concerns will have a negative 
effect on trusting beliefs. 
Hypothesis 2: Automotive users’ information privacy concerns will have a positive 
effect on risk beliefs. 
Hypothesis 3: Trusting beliefs will have a negative effect on risk beliefs. 
Hypothesis 4: Trusting beliefs will have a positive effect on intention to reveal per-
sonal information. 
Hypothesis 5: Risk beliefs will have a negative effect on intention to reveal personal 
information. 
Hypothesis 6: An automotive manufacturer or third party’s request for more sensitive 
information will have a negative effect on trusting beliefs. 
Hypothesis 7: An automotive manufacturer or third party’s request for more sensitive 
information will have a positive effect on risk beliefs. 
Hypothesis 8: An automotive manufacturer or third party’s request for more sensitive 
information will have a negative effect on intention to reveal personal information. 
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Positivist research observes the social phenomena and view of reality in order to deduce 
generalized patterns (Bhattacherjee 2012). The popular positivist methods are laboratory 
experiments and survey researches. Positivist research is an increasingly common re-
search method in information systems literature and it is efficient to build a process ori-
ented phenomenon. This research uses positivist research methods to perform its analysis. 
Survey analysis are done through online survey as a tool for data collections. 
 
1.5.2 Structure of this report 
 
The structure of this report is divided into chapters. The elaboration of the chapters are 
explained below: 
 
Chapter 2 Modern automobile’s architecture: The internal architecture of automobile sys-
tems are explained here. The architecture of network packets, infrastructure are also stud-
ied in detail. The word “automotive”, “automobile” and “car” have been used inter-
changeably.  
 
Chapter 3 Attack taxonomy and phases: The attack surfaces and various methods are 
studied in this chapter.  
 
Chapter 4 Related work: Researches and related work of automotive cybersecurity are 
explored in this chapter. 
 
Chapter: 5 Result analysis: The survey results in this research are studied into three sec-
tions 1) Information privacy 2) Attack surfaces 3) User awareness. 
 
Chapter 6 Conclusion: This chapter discussed and validated the hypotheses of this re-




2 MODERN AUTOMOBILE’S ARCHITECTURE 
Since the beginning of car production until 1970, the electronic components in cars were 
very limited to the spark plugs and radio systems. The major functions and operations 
were mainly mechanical processes (Vyleta 2014). The Clean Air Act was introduced in 
1970 where electronics were introduced in order to design an efficient combustion sys-
tem. The Clean Air Act was looking for lower emission engine and as a result the carbu-
rettors were quickly replaced by Electronic Fuel Injection (EFI) engines with more effec-
tive combustions (Rogers 1990). The combustions were effective because electronic con-
trol units (ECU) can adjust the fuel/oxygen mixture before combustion in an efficient way 
(Koscher 2014). Thus the era of car computerization began. Today most of the old me-
chanical systems such as steering control, anti-lock braking systems or parking brakes are 
replaced by drive-by-wire. It is a process of transforming mechanical linkages in cars into 
a form of electromechanical systems (Wolf – Weimerskirch – Paar 2004). Safety was 
expanded in drive-by-wire after the introduction of different car features such as Elec-
tronic stability control, parking assistance and adaptive cruise controls.      
The in-vehicle network architecture can be compared with a SCADA (Supervisory Con-
trol and Data Acquisition) system (Carsten – Andel – Yampolskiy – McDonald 2015). 
This kind of system collects and monitors data from a number of sensors and use a control 
unit to process it. These control units are alternately called electronic control units or 
engine control units (ECUs). A typical car can have about 50-70 ECUs depending on the 
number of functionalities it offers (Nilsson – Phung – Larson 2014). Each ECU is respon-
sible for its own functionality that varies from controlling the washer fluid to apply adap-
tive braking in cruise control when there is an obstacle in front.        
2.1 ECU components 
An ECU is a printed circuitry which has many electrical components run by firmware 
(Prathap – Rachumallu 2013).  The ECU can be compared with modern desktop comput-
ers as they both have similar basic components. ECU has input and output functionalities 
and it sends or receives data from sensors or actuators. The sensors convert the physical 
and mechanical data such as temperature and speedometer readings into electronic forms 
that can be read by the ECUs. On the other hand, actuators do the opposite. It receives 
data from the ECU and converts them to mechanical reading that is understandable by the 
respective components in the vehicle. The processor speed in an ECU is lesser than a 
desktop computer. Typically it can have a 32 bit 40 MHz processor cable capable to per-
form its functionalities. If we compare the processing capability of this processor with a 
desktop computer, it will be much lower and cheaper as well. Since each ECU has their 
own tasks unlike central processing units in desktop computers, they are able to work 
efficiently with less power. There are two types of memory in a typical ECU, a flash 
memory and a RAM memory. (Prathap et al 2013.) The flash memory is non-volatile 
where the RAM memory is not. Anything stored in flash memory will stay when the ECU 
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is powered off whereas the contents in RAM memory will be erased. The bootloader also 
has two parts, a primary bootloader (PBL) and a secondary bootloader (SBL). The flash 
memory cannot be overwritten as it has the PBL which is necessary for starting up the 
ECUs. When an ECU is powered on, the PBL is executed to load the SBL into RAM 
memory. Then the RAM memory is used to modify any program code in the ECUs. 
 
All of these ECUs inside a car use some kind of communication system or bus to transfer 
data between each other (Koscher 2014). This networked system also varies from each 
other, there can be proprietary buses as well as non-proprietary with different designs and 
specifications (Koscher 2014).  
Local Interconnect Network (LIN):  LIN protocol was designed to be a low cost, low 
powered network for  task that are not mission critical to the system. It was first specified 
in 1999 and it was the “silicone implementation based on common UART/SCI interface 
hardware” (LIN Consortium 2006). It is a single wire subnetwork which mostly depends 
on the Controller Area Network (CAN). LIN is much cheaper to implement and used for 
processes where other heavily network such as CAN is not fully required. LIN is capable 
to have collision free communication to maximum of 16 hosts using its single master 
mechanism. The validations of the LIN packets are set by its parity bits and checksum. 
LIN can go to sleep mode when necessary and hence saves on power. LIN has an average 
data rate of 20 kilobit per second.  
Controller Area Network (CAN): It is one of the most popular standards used in most 
of the cars and also one of the oldest protocol. With the ability to transfer data with a rate 
of up to one megabit per second, CAN is an event triggered serial bus system (Prathap et 
al 2013). CAN was first published in 1986 by Robert Bosch GmbH (Vyleta 2014). It was 
designed with reliability in mind and it can also work when some nodes are defective due 
to its multi-master architecture. Error protection is done using cyclic redundancy check 
and also by using the parity bits. An addressing scheme is not used in CAN protocol, 
however it works on broadcast mechanism. CAN packets are broadcast to all the nodes 
and the appropriate node acts accordingly by examining the message type. Packets with 
high priority are sent and they are processed with urgencies, and hence CAN is most 
suitable for critical systems such as brakes and steering.    
Media Oriented Systems Transport (MOST): This is a high speed serial bus mainly 
used for transmitting multimedia such as audio and video inside the car. Due to the heavy 
load of multimedia and control data, the transfer speed of this bus is high as well. It has 
the capability to transfer a rate of 24 Megabit per second for synchronous and 14 Megabit 
per second for asynchronous transmission. Unlike CAN packets, the MOST packets con-
tains both the sender’s and receiver’s information. MOST uses either a ring, star or bus 
topology which can connect up to 64 plug and play devices. (Prathap 2013.)    
FlexRay: Originally developed by joint effort of BMW and DaimlerChrysler, the devel-
opment of FlexRay was started in 2000 and was supposed to be the successor of CAN 
bus. It is an error tolerant and reliable high speed but which was standardized as ISO 
17458 in 2013 (Vyleta 2014). It has speed of 10 megabit per second and robust enough 
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to handle safety critical situations with its redundant mechanism. The error tolerance is 
guided through channel redundancy, checksum calculation and independent bus guardian 
to minimize logical errors (Prathap et al 2013). Time division multiple access (TDMA) 
method is used in FlexRay for handling the priority in various transmission. TDMA is a 
mechanism to slice up a single channel into time slots and each time slot is used to trans-
mit a portion of the data in logical format (Frenzel 2013). 
Ethernet: Ethernet is one of the most popular protocol in computer networking and now 
has been used in cars too. The first car with Ethernet based parking camera was present 
in BMW X5 in 2013 (Yoshida 2013). A direct comparison of Ethernet protocol can be 
done with MOST as both of them operates in the Open Systems Interconnection layers 
and Ethernet said to be much efficient (Vyleta 2014). Ethernet is an established protocol 
which is also 100 times faster than CAN bus (Sauerwald 2014) but still it was not a lu-
crative options for the automakers due to its limitations. It was unable to meet the require-
ment of automotive market, especially the OEM EMI/RFI (Automotive Ethernet: An 
Overview 2014).  A standard achieved through proper shielding and filtering (Lish 2015). 
Ethernet has too much latency and is susceptible to radio frequency noises from its own 
and also from other devices.        
 
Wireless: Wireless networking protocols has been readily used in modern cars in various 
ways. It is possible to pair mobile phones to cars via Bluetooth technologies. Tire pres-
sures can be displayed on the dashboard in real time via near field communications 
(NFC). Even the modern cars can be locked/unlocked or remotely start via wireless fobs. 
The wireless protocol and technology used varies and so does the properties. Recently an 
important concept in wireless technology has been developed, which is known as C2X, 
which can be categorized to C2C (car to car) or C2I (car to infrastructure) communication 
(Drive C2X). It is believed that by creating an ad-hoc network between cars will help to 
safeguard the cars and make them more efficient. It is to be note that most of the consumer 
electronics and entertainment system in modern cars operate based on wireless technolo-
gies. A comparison of these wireless network technologies are shown in the following 
table: 
Table 1 Common Wireless network technologies in cars (Vyleta 2014) 
Technology Purpose Range 
Tire Pressure monitoring systems 
(TPMS) 
Safety and convenience  Meters 
Bluetooth technology Entertainment Meters 
Keyless entry system Comfort, security Couple of me-
ters 





























































































































































































2.2 Controller Area Network Bus or CAN Bus 
Although there are a number of protocols to implement on vehicle bus, but starting from 
2008, all cars sold in U.S. are required to have CAN bus architecture (Koscher 2014). 
Ultimately most of the dominant automakers such as BMW, Ford, GM, Honda, and 
Toyota gradually shifted to CAN bus and hence it is the most common bus architecture 
present in cars today. The CAN packets used in CAN bus has certain properties that might 
be similar to transmission control protocol (TCP) or internet protocol (IP) packets. Two 
types of CAN packets are standard and extended packets.  
  
 
Figure 4 Standard CAN packet (Corrigan 2008) 
 
The packet consists of segments with different purposes: 
Start of frame (SOF): The start-of-frame header, it is 1 bit. 
Identifier: This identifier is used to prioritize the packet, the lower the value, the higher 
is the priority. Moreover it is indicate which ECU can process the information. It is 11 bit 
in length. 
Remote transmission Request (RTR): Although the packet is distributed to all ECU 
nodes, this RTR bit indicates when an information is required from a specific node. It is 
also 1 bit.   
IDE (short for identifier): It is a single bit that distinguishes between a standard and 
extended CAN packet (Carsten et al 2015). 
R0: This is also a single bit which is currently not in use, it is reserved for future use. 
Date Length Code (DLC): This is a 4 bit segment to indicate the length of the data to be 
transmitted.   
Data: the actual data to be transmitted. It can be up to 8 bytes (64 bits) in length. 
Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC): This 16 bit segment is used to validate the packet 
and contains the checksum value. 
Acknowledge (ACK): Initially this 2 bit segment is set to zero. The receiving node check 
for errors in the packet and if it is error free, then ACK bit is flipped to one. 




Inter-frame space (IFS): the flag represents the time which the controller used to move 
the frame into the buffer, it is usually 7 bit long. 
The extended CAN bus packets come with a 29 bit identifier flag instead of the 11 bit 
standard identifier. The rest of the bits are used for an alternate version of RTR and extra 
space for the identifier (Carsten et al 2015). A sample extended packet is shown below 
(Koscher 2014). 
 
Figure 5 Extended CAN packer (Koscher 2014) 
 
2.3 Potential vulnerabilities in CAN bus architecture 
CAN bus has a number of weaknesses that was inherited from its earlier versions. Some 
of the common vulnerabilities are discussed below. 
CAN packets are broadcast in nature: CAN protocol works in a broadcast manner. 
When a packet needs to be send to any of the ECUs, it is send to all of the nodes and the 
specific node accepts it and the rest drops it. It gives room for the malicious attackers to 
snoop CAN packets if somehow the attacker becomes part of the network where the pack-
ets are send in. After capturing live packets from the network the attacker can reverse 
engineer and retrieve further information to portray his attack.  
Vulnerable to Denial of Service: CAN bus are very vulnerable to denial of service at-
tacks. If a flood of high priority packets are send it can push a node to act “dominant” and 
hence other nodes will back off and service denial will occur. (Koscher 2014.) 
Lack of authenticator fields: Another disadvantages of CAN packets is the lack of au-
thenticator fields in the packets. It is not possible to know the sender's address and hence 
any nodes can send any packets to any other nodes, including nodes that are compromised 
by attackers. Thus an attacker has the ability to spoof a packet and disguise the destination 
ECU.    
Weak access control: One of the pillars in information security is confidentiality and 
access control is a major part of it (Smith 2015). There is no legitimate access control for 
CAN bus and it is very easy to access it via On-board diagnostics with the help of special 
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tools. However there are challenge response mechanism for re-flashing the ECU and for 




3 ATTACK TAXONOMY 
Common terms are needed in computer and network security to understand a same sce-
nario. Howard el al. introduced a set of terms that can used seamlessly to describe attack 
scenarios. These are general terms to structure an incident in a logical manner. A typical 
attack consists of Tools, Vulnerability, Action, Target and Unauthorized results. (Howard 
& Longstaff 1998) The tools are the software, application or instruments used by attacker 
to exploit the vulnerabilities in an automotive system. Vulnerabilities are the flaws and 
weaknesses that are present in a system and which the attackers take advantages. Actions 
are the process or steps taken to exploit those vulnerabilities and it is usually directed 
towards the target. Target is the victim or subject of the attack and unauthorized results 
are the outcome of a successful attack and the fruits of the whole process (Prathap et al 
2013). On top of that there are two more keywords used to distinguish an attack, they are 
events and incidents. An event is a single activity or state of change in a system and a 
group of events can be categorized as an incident. An attack happens when there is an 
incident towards a target using tools to exploit its vulnerability to outcome unauthorized 
results.  
3.1 Attack phases 
Cyber-attack can be categorized into seven phases according to InfoSec Institute (Stoneff 
2015). Automotive networks are somewhat similar and can also be expressed into same 
phases:  
Reconnaissance: This is the initial phase where an attacker set a target and start gathering 
information about the system. It can be visual observation of the system or trying to con-
nect to the system, getting reply back from the system and analysing the results.  The 
attackers tries to get as much information as possible about vulnerable areas of the car 
such as open ports, outdated software etc. Various monitoring tools are used hook into 
the car system and analyse the data packets. 
Scanning: This is the phase where the attacker already set the target and in the process 
of infiltrating the system. Vigorous scanning tools are used to find open ends to the sys-
tem. Different vulnerability tools are used to penetrate vulnerable entry points in the car. 
Usually this process takes time as an attacker might have limited time to get exposed to a 
vehicle to try its scanners.  
Access and Escalation:  In this phase the attacker already identified the weakness in the 
system and now trying to break into it. He may use rainbow table or similar tools to brute 
force and gain access through the vulnerable entry point(s). The hacker would like to have 
privileged access so that he has the freedom to move around and alter things. When the 
attacker has the privileged access to a system, it can be said that the system is “owned” 
by the attacker. Owned (also written as poned or pwned) is an urban slang used in hacker 
and gamer community to get control of a device against one’s will (Gil 2013).  
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Exfiltration: At this phase the attacker has privileged access to the car system and hence 
he is able to hop in from network to network. The attacker now can extract private data 
about the car and the driver as well as analyse and reverse engineer CAN Bus packets for 
further attacks. 
Sustainment: The attacker also needs to hide himself from getting exposed. In this phase 
the attacker configured a stealth process to access the car network from time to time and 
also not getting noticed by the user. He may also configured multiple access points to 
enter to the car’s network. 
Assault: This is the phase where things get nasty. Maliciously tailored CAN Bus packets 
are pushed into the system that may result in catastrophic outcomes. The driver may ex-
perience denial of services, malfunctioning of the devices at motion that can result in life 
threatening accidents. The assault and damage done to a car system can vary in various 
ways depending on the motto of the attacker. 
Obfuscation: This is the last phase where the attacker tries to hide his identity. This is 
done by erasing the traces or footprints the attacker made in the last few phases. The 
reason behind it is to spoof the forensic personnel to trace back to the attacker. Sometimes 
the attacker wants to know the victim of its art and can leave traces intentionally as tokens. 
It is called “calling card” which is used to boast about the ability to own a system and 
exploit it. 
3.2 Attack surfaces 
Attack surfaces or attack vectors are the number of ways an attacker can get into a system. 
It is described as all the different gateways attackers can get data out of the system 
(OWASP 2015). In modern automobiles, the attack surface is broad as there are several 
physical devices which are either directly or indirectly connected to the internal systems 
of a car (Checkoway - McCoy - Kantor - Anderson - Shacham - Savage - Koscher - Czes-
kis- Roesner - Kohno 2011).  
3.2.1 Indirect Physical 
The most straightforward approach is using the OBD-II port (Carsten et al 2015). On-
Board diagnostic or OBD has been introduced in early seventies for manufacturers to 
connect electronically to the engine and later in mid-nineties the more sophisticated ver-
sion, OBD-II was introduced. OBD-II is a universal access port and it is widely used to 
check if a car is maintaining its OEM standard for emission. The port is located right at 
the bottom of the steering wheel. All cars which are built after January 01, 1996, should 
supposed to have an OBD-II port. (OBD-II Home page 2011.) When a car is taken to a 
service station, this port can be commonly used by the mechanic or other service person-
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nel such as customer service representatives or helpers. Hence a full physical attack sur-
face exist within the OBD-II ports. Few years ago it was still specialized handheld tools 
which were needed to access these OBD-II ports. Technicians would use tools like Ford’s 
NGS or Nissan’s Consult II to diagnose the car via the OBD-II port (Checkoway et al 
2011). But a PC-centric trend has been going on since then and there were a tendency for 
connecting personal computer at ease with the ports. Nowadays the modern vehicle can 
be connected to computers via the OBD-II ports with the help of specialized software. 
These software are specially written to analyse data from the ports in order to diagnose it 
efficiently. Usually the port does not have a safety cap or lock and it can be readily avail-
able for anyone who has access to the car for a shorter time. It is possible to attach a third 
party device to the OBD-II port unnoticed and transmit CAN Bus packets to an intruders’ 
destination.  
Another physical attack surface for the modern cars is the entertainment system. Almost 
all of the cars have some sort of entertainment functionalities that allows user to play an 
audio disc, connect mobiles phones or iPod to the system and play music from there. 
There is possibility for attacker to disguise a user with CD encoded with malware instead 
of music. Hence when the user plays it into his system, the entertainment system can be 
corrupted. Although a compromised audio system can be considered as limited threat but 
the overlapping of vehicles network architecture always keeps an open door for attacker 
to infiltrate further.  
3.2.2 Short-range wireless access 
Although Bluetooth is considered to be the mostly used wireless access technology in 
automobiles (Checkoway et al 2011) but there are few others which are used almost 
equally. The common ones are the remote keyless entry, RFID, tire pressure monitoring 
systems (TPMS) and Wi-Fi. Most of the manufacturers are shipping modern cars with 
remote keyless entry. It allows the user to lock, unlock cars from a short distance. Some 
cars also has remote start ability which comes in handy during winter times. There are 
RFID enabled car keys which even do not need a button to push. The car will automati-
cally unlock itself when the user comes to a close proximity to the car. The TPMS uses 
external sensors inside the tire to monitor and send tire pressures and has the ability to 
communicate with the vehicle’s internal systems. Short ranged 802.11 Wi-Fi has been 
introduced by BMW earlier to monitor its backup cameras (Murray 2013) and more and 
more manufacturers are planning to embed Wi-Fi as well. Wi-Fi hotspot has been offered 
by major manufacturers that would allow users to bridge its 3G data link to be used as a 
Wi-Fi hotspot inside the car. Ford offered this capability in its Ford Focus back in 2012 
(Checkoway et al 2011). A not yet fully implemented technology known as Dedicated 
Short Range Communications (DSRC) is also been developed which will actively support 
the vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) from safety point of 
view (Walton 2015). DSRC is a two-way short to medium range communication which 
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has the ability to transmit data in a very fast pace. If the external nodes for these enter-
tainment systems are not guarded well, then there can be possibilities to compromise a 
system and traverse to the core vehicle system and plot damage.  
3.2.3 Long-range wireless 
Modern vehicles are also equipped with long-range wireless communication technologies 
which usually has a range of more than a kilometer. Those technologies can be catego-
rized into two types: broadcast channels and addressable channels. Broadcast channels 
are more generic in nature and they are not focused on particular vehicles, but they can 
be “tuned into” by receivers if needed (Checkoway et al 2011). If a broadcast channel is 
compromised, then there is the possibilities of mass infections of a number of cars at a 
given time. A typical use of broadcast channel technologies can be using auto manufac-
turer provided Global Positioning System (GPS), satellite radio or Traffic Message Chan-
nel (TMC). Although the range of these signals absolutely depends on the power of the 
transmitter but an average range of a 1.2 kbps signal can come with a range of up to 10 
km. This gives the attacker a safer and wider area to carry on an attack and not get caught. 
Addressable channels are more customized and there is a dedicated connection with con-
tinuous connectivity between a provider and a vehicle. These channels can be used for 
more personalized services such as sending crash reports to service providers, remote 
shutdown of the car engine in case of theft, and convenience such as hands free and driv-
ing directions. Popular remote telematic systems that use addressable channels are Ford’s 
Sync, GM’s OnStar and Chrysler's UConnect. 
3.2.4 Firmware-Over-The-Air (FOTA) 
The car industry is going forward to the same direction as the mobile phone industry, 
which encountered it thirteen years ago (Red Bend Ltd 2011). The increasing number of 
software maintenance and the demand of amending the firmware is pushing the industry 
towards faster, efficient and reliable methods. Over-the-air (OTA) technologies has been 
used in mobile phone industries since the last decades and is getting its attention towards 
the automotive industries due to its quicker and simplistic ways of reducing the warranty 
cost for the manufactures, increase the number of software recalls in a given amount of 
time and also increasing the customer satisfactions (Bird 2016). When the updates are 
installed over the air, the manufacturers do not need specialized tools and dedicated per-
sonnel for serving a single car. Sometimes over the air updates can be setup for multiple 
number of cars at the same time. Thus an Auto manufacturers can service more vehicles 
in a shorter time during the process of a software recall. Hence customers have to spend 
less time in the service stations. Firmware are the set of instructions or programs special-
ized to run a hardware device, mostly an embedded system (Tech Terms 2016). Firmware 
-over-the-air is a method which is yet to be popular in the automobile industry but it is 
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the idea of updating or upgrading the ECUs firmware over the air i.e. without any physical 
touch with a device. FOTA works in three stages of updates, 1) Generating the update, 2) 
managing and delivering of the update and 3) performing the update (Red Bend Ltd 
2011). In the first stage, based on the vehicle identification number (VIN), the required 
update is sorted out. Then a connection is established between the vehicle and the com-
puter in the service center, the update is transferred to the car via wireless technology and 
then the update is verified for errors. The last stage is the update being installed in the car 
systems and the system restarts with the new updates. Audi, BMW and Tesla has been 
announced to update the in-built navigation systems over the air, Hyundai and Ford al-
ready has proof of concept for over the air updates. Infotainment software application has 
been already in the process of OTA by quite a few manufacturers. And estimated of 1.3 
million vehicles has been released in 2015 which has the ability to update infotainment 
systems over the air and professionals are expect this number to increase to 17.6 million 
by 2022. (Bird 2016.)  Telematic control units such as General Motor’s GM OnStar and 
Verizon’s telematic systems (available in many cars in the US) has the capability to get 
update over the air. Updating the core ECU is still in the process of acceptance by most 
of the automotive manufacturers but Tesla already has it in place. Tesla model S regularly 
receives software update over the air and it takes approximately 45 minutes to complete 
(Tesla Motors 2016). Although OTA and FOTA bring convenience and efficiency in the 
automotive industries but it also opens up a wider range of attack surfaces for the modern 
connected cars. There can be numerous possibilities to attack in over the air technologies 
if they are not secure enough. 
3.3 Attack methods 
3.3.1 Data stealing 
The basic and easiest attack that is possible on an automotive network is data stealing 
(Carsten et al 2015). CAN bus architecture is broadcast in nature and hence the CAN data 
packets are send to each and every node in the vehicle network. The expected node will 
accept it and the rest will discard the packet. It gives the opportunity for any compromised 
host to listen to every packets in the network and get necessary information and pass it to 
the attacker. Insurance company such as The Personal and Desjardins are offering an app 
called Ajusto will can be installed in one’s cell phone and can monitor the driving behav-
ior. Before the insurance company used to offer a device that can be attached to the OBD-
II slot. It collects the driving data such as acceleration and braking behavior of a driver, 
bridge it to the cell phone, and use the cell phone network to transmit it to the service 
provider. They say a driver can save up to 25% in auto insurance by driving properly 
(Saltzman 2015). The device is now not offered anymore, instead the cell phone app has 
become much ‘cleaver’ and can do the job itself. The app is offered in both iOS and 
Android platform and with the user consent, it collects the driving behavior based on the 
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movement of the phone’s accelerometer. Accelerometers are used to measure the dis-
placement of a device and are able to calculate the velocity, motion and movement of a 
person, hence the car as well.  Ajusto app calculated the driving behavior of the driver 
based on certain conditions and score the person in a scale of 1-100. The current insurance 
drops based on how good is the driving behavior. Almost twenty five percent of custom-
ers have been already enrolled in this program which is offered for the last two years 
(Saltzman 2015). This rises a great deal of privacy as lots of personal data has been sent 
to the service providers, that includes where the driver is going, is he using his cell phone 
while on the road and other user behaviors. If an attacker can compromise one of the 
attack surface, such as the cell phone or the insurance app, then he can get hold of all 
these personal data.       
3.3.2 Control override 
This is a serious type of attack. A scenario can be described as driving at 70 miles per 
hour and suddenly the steering took a sharp right turn and the vehicle crashes (Pagliery 
2014). This is the type of scenario come to anyone’s mind when they think their car is 
hacked. This is the control override where an attacker can take over the control of a driver 
and manipulate the car against the driver’s will. Currently this attack is possible to certain 
extend. As we know that CAN packets are broadcast to all the nodes in a vehicle network 
and the packets with high priority are always serves first. So if an attacker compromised 
a node in the network and flood the network with high priority packets, then a denial of 
service scenarios can happen. Some specific nodes can be halt by spoofing that it is busy 
with high priority packets. Either the nodes will be unresponsive or responds in the man-
ner the attacker wants. A team of researchers were able to control override a vehicle which 
was moving at a 40 mph speed (Koscher 2014). They were able to honk the horns, blasting 
the heat and kill the engine of the car while in motion. The driver was restricted to restart 
the car. The team was also able to interact with the Electronic Brake Control Module 
(EBCM) and manipulate it accordingly. In the expensive report of Valasek and Miller 
(2015) they mentioned that this types of brake override is only possible with certain con-
ditions to be fulfilled. The car has to be in hacker’s favorable state and a number of CAN 
bus needs to be override. However they have shown that the brakes can be bleed with 
manipulating some other diagnostic commands. The team was able to own the brake of a 
2014 Jeep Cherokee and guide it to a ditch at a speed of 5 mph.     
3.3.3 Vehicle degradation 
Vehicle degradation is the process of harming the vehicle with the help of compromised 
CAN bus packets. When a vehicle is low of supply such as engine oil, fuel or even radiator 
water, it shows the warning on the dash board. The driver notices the warning and take 
necessary measures to maintain the optimum level of supplies in the vehicle. Is has been 
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shown by the researcher to falsify the CAN packets and not show the actual condition of 
the vehicle. By doing that, medium to severe degradation of the vehicle is possible. Vala-
sek and Miller (2015) was able to circulate a diagnostic packet in the network that will 
sense lack of fuel in the car and prevent the car from starting. Until and unless the packet 
is roaming in the system, it was not possible to start the car at all. In manual transmission 
cars, the gear shift is necessary after a certain RPM of the engine. RPM is a unit that gives 
the number of rotation of motor in the engine and it’s linked to the gear shifting of the 
vehicle. Damage can happen to the transmission system if high RPM is obtained and the 
car is still in the lower gear. It is possible for attackers to spoof the RPM information on 
the dashboard and hence disguising the driver to shift on time.   
3.3.4 Data falsification 
Data falsification is the process of showing or giving wrong data to the user from the 
vehicle network. Modern cars have Airbag control system which checks the working air-
bags and informs the driver about their conditions. According to Yoshida (2013) it is 
possible to generate CAN packets that will falsify those data even in case there is no 
airbag in the vehicle at all (Hoppe – Kiltz – Dittmann 2010). The researchers show that 
old information of the airbag can be displayed in the system and disguise the driver that 
there are working airbags in the car. On the other hand, Valasek and Miller (2015) showed 
that it is possible to falsify the reading of speedometer and odometer in a vehicle. By 
showing a lesser value on the speedometer the driver is exposed to legal issues as well as 
falsified on his driving habits. Odometer changing can be a very big issue for used car 
sales market. The prices of a used vehicle directly depends on the number of kilometers 
it ran before. So if someone can decrease or change the numbers on the odometer, he can 
sale a vehicle for a substantial price.      
3.3.5 External sensor attack 
Modern vehicles are loaded with external sensors these days. These external sensors are 
used in various operations in the vehicle. Starting from adaptive braking system (ABS) 
to automatic parking assist, these external sensors are the vital sources of information for 
day to day operations. If an attacker manages to compromise an external sensors, it will 
be very easy for him to plot a physical attack with the mobility of the vehicle. Which 
using adaptive braking system, if the sensors are compromised, a car can hit another car 
in miscalculations. Proximity warning could be misled by the attacker which the driver is 
performing a parking with automatic parking assistance.     
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3.3.6 Attacking TPMS 
Tire pressure monitoring system (TPMS) is a small device which resides inside the tire. 
It connects information such as the tire’s air pressure, temperature and rotational speed 
and report to the car ECU (Smith 2014). The device is registered with the car’s ECU with 
a 32-bit unique identifier. Normally the TPMS device is in sleep mode and wakes up in 
two ways. Either the car needs to run at a speed of 40 mph or a radio frequency device 
wakes the TPMS sensors. The radio frequency needs to be 125 kHz low frequency in 
order to wake up the TPMS.  Few possible attack on TPMS can be: 
 Tracking the vehicle: An attacker can track a vehicle based on its unique ID in a 
certain route. Specific sensors should be place in the possible route of the vehicle 
in order to track it. The TPMS usually broadcast in every 60-90 seconds and low 
frequency amplifier can be used to strengthen the receiving sensors and amplify 
its range. 
 Triggered events: Theoretically it is possible to trigger an event when a vehicle 
with unique identifier is near a triggering sensors. So it is possible to open a garage 
door while the vehicle is near and it can also be possible to blow up a bomb when 
a vehicle passes a certain path and comes near to a sensor. This can be a devastat-
ing attack if vehicle id of a VIP or politically important person is exposed to ter-
rorist groups. 
 Spoofing: It can also be possible to damage the tires by spoofing the data received 
from the sensor and not putting any warning lights on the dashboard. 
3.3.7 Ethernet attacks 
Ethernet has been the de-facto standard for most of the computer network but it is yet to 
be seen in mass for automotive networks (Yoshida 2013). Ethernet was not used much in 
automotive network due to its lack of standards with the OEM EMI/RFI requirements as 
well as its high latency in data transfer rate (Ixia Worldwide Inc. 2014). But some of the 
leading auto manufacturers already using Ethernet technology in some part of its systems 
such as backup camera. BMW released its model X5 with Ethernet based 360 degree 
parking assistance backup camera (Yoshida 2013). Ethernet network is much familiar to 
the computer geeks and hacker communities and it can be easily analysed by freely avail-
able software like WireShark. When an attack get access to the Ethernet nodes of a vehi-
cle, then it will much easier for him to tailor an attack and much efficiently drop its pay-
load.  
3.3.8 Attacking key fobs and immobilizer 
Key fobs and immobilizers are convenient devices used to lock/unlock or remote start the 
vehicle from a short distance. These remote keyless systems runs at 315 MHz in North 
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America and in approximately 434 MHz in Asia and Europe (Smith 2014). The older 
model key fobs used to use infrared communication technology. There is usually a tran-
sponder which uses rolling code to authenticate with the immobilizer. The typical tran-
sponder operates at 125 KHz and communicate with the immobilizer through radio fre-
quency identification (RFID). Potential attack on key fobs can be: 
 Jamming the key fob with junk data and hence prevent the receiver to change the 
rolling code. Hence it will allow the attacker to see the current key sequence. 
 Sometimes the key is stored in the memory of the immobilizer for a short period 
of time. The attacker may grab that information and start the vehicle without the 
key. 
 Attacks are possible on older immobilizer where static keys are used instead of 
rolling keys. 
 It is sometimes possible to dump the memory of the transponder and reverse en-
gineer the secret key. 
 Spoof the driver by jamming the car lock and giving an impression that the car 
was locked properly, where in real it is not. Hence the car will still be unlocked 
and it gives the attacker opportunity to steal items from the car.  
3.3.9 Passive keyless entry and start 
Passive keyless entry is quite similar to the immobilizer system but here the driver does 
not need to click any buttons in the device. When the driver approaches near the car with 
the device in his pocket, a security exchange takes places between the car systems and 
the key fob device and the car allows the driver to drive the car without any key. It is 
possible to apply relay attack on this scenario. An attacker place a device next the car and 
another one next to the driver. When the driver get close to the vehicle, the device relays 
the signals to the vehicle and back and hence the attacker has the opportunity to start the 
car before the driver.   
3.3.10 Keypad entry 
There are some vehicles which are shipped with keypad entry systems situated under the 
handle of the car. If an attacker has enough time to perform a permutation combination, 
then he can try all the possible combinations and has the potential to open the door of the 




3.4 Types of attack 
3.4.1 Side channel attacks 
Side channel attacks are the attacks that are caused by the side channel information (Bar-
El 2014). Side channel information are the data that is passed while a cryptographic anal-
ysis is done. Usually these information are not plain text nor totally encrypted as well. 
Side channel attacks have been a challenging issue among the security researchers who 
are specialized in cryptanalysis.  Side channel data analysis can be of two types, simple 
analysis and differential analysis.  In simple analysis, an attacker takes a small trace of 
the crypto operation inside the car and analyse it to find the secret key. In modern cryp-
tography, public key infrastructure is a very popular approach for encryption. Here each 
node has its own pair of public key and private key as well. When a node needs to send 
an encrypted message, it uses the public key of the other node to encrypt and send the 
message. The destination node receives the message and decrypt it using its private key. 
The modern cryptographic devices are mostly designed with Complementary Metal-Ox-
ide-Semiconductor (CMOS) gates which has data dependent power consumption (Saeedi 
– Kong 2014). That means there is a change of power flow in the semiconductor in ac-
cordance with the data flow. When the node access the private key to decrypt the message, 
electron flows in the CMOS conductor and it emits electromagnetic radiations. The at-
tacker can guess the secret key from the source of that radiation leakage. On the other 
hand, differential analysis uses statistical tools to study an array of data in order to have 
an accurate differential power and electromagnetic analysis.  
3.4.2 Timing attacks 
These types of attack is similar to the side channel attack where the attacker focuses on 
the time needed to perform an operation. Different cryptographic devices need different 
amount of time to encrypt or decrypt a data based on the size of the data and algorithm 
used. It is possible for an attacker to find fixed Diffie-Hellman exponents or factor RSA 
keys just by measure the time taken to perform private key operations (Kocher 1996). 
These time analysis and measurements are fed into a statistical model, it can check cor-
relations between time measurements and provide possible key bits based on some degree 
of uncertainty (Bar-El 2014). It was shown that it is possible to reconstruct the screen 
content of a video display unit just by analysing the electromagnetic data produced by it 




3.4.3 Fault injection and reverse engineering attack 
Fault injection attack is a wide spreading technique used by attacker where different fac-
tors are altered in a device. As for an example an attacker might change the power supply 
voltage level of a cryptographic device inside the car and see how it reacts on low power 
environment. Other factors the attacker can alter are injection of irregular clock signals, 
rise the temperature of the device or its surrounding or expose the device to intense lights 
(Barenghi - Breveglieri - Koren - Naccache 2012). By changing the factors, each device 
behaves in a different ways. The attacker notes down those differences and compare them 
to a fully functional device. It has been shown by researchers that it is possible to invade 
some cryptographic devices such as SNOW 3G and RSA to some extent using fault in-
jection attack (Barenghi et al 2012). Reverse engineering is a process of understanding 
how a device or an algorithm works by reversing and analysing the procedure. Sometimes 
by doing so, a device can be unresponsive and cannot be used later on. By reverse engi-
neering attack, a person can gain inside knowledge of the architecture of a device or sys-




4 RELATED WORKS 
A literature review in the domain of interest is the process of finding out what has been 
done related to a field of study (Bhattacherjee 2012). The three main reasons of literature 
reviews are: 
 
1) Get to know the current state of knowledge in the area of the research. 
2) To identify the prominent authors and researchers who have worked in this area 
and 
3) To identify the knowledge gap in the research area. 
4.1 Related works on Intrusion Detection 
In the article by Hori, Sasaki, Miyamatsu and Yakura (2000, 25) Development of Intru-
sion Detection Sensor for Vehicle Anti-theft Systems, the researchers have experimented 
and demonstrated a vehicle intrusion detection system based on Radio wave. The reuni-
fication of east and West Germany and the collapse of Soviet Union lead to a sharp in-
crease in car burglary during that time, and hence there was a high demand of vehicle 
anti-theft systems. Fujitsu ten was developing and marketing these devices since 1990 as 
an optional gadget for the cars until there was a need for adding them in the production 
line past 1998. The developed device that was explained in the article was designed to 
meet the U.K Insurers’ certification requirements. Which in turn consists of two major 
test, an environment resistance test such as the temperature test and the actual anti-theft 
mechanism test with the sensors’ performance. There should be a detection requirement 
and erroneous detection prevention. The sensor should be smart enough to alarm when 
there is an intruder and also ignore if a person just passing by the car. The detection tech-
nologies that are mainly used are radio waves and ultrasonic waves. An outstanding com-
parison of radio waves type and ultrasonic wave type sensors are done in respect to the 
effect on design, detection range and malfunction. The detection principle behind these 
waves is that, there is a transmitter and a receiver mechanism. The receiver is receiving 
the sinusoidal patterned waves from the transmitter and if there is any anomaly in the 
waves, an alert is generated. 
 
Vestlund (2014) explained about the possible intrusion detection system (IDS) idea in his 
paper Intrusion Detection Systems in Networked Embedded Systems. The author pointed 
out the high risk of intrusion in the automotive network due to its increased networking 
abilities and he suggested to deploy intrusion detection systems in order to prevent it. 
Christian explained intrusion detection system as a “burglar alarm for computers that let 
someone know about the burglar”. (Vestlund 2014) So the intrusion caused by the burglar 
is detected by a system and the system either notify the owner or does something by its 
own to mitigate the intrusion. IDS has been used in computing systems for quite some-
times and it has a good impact on auditing. IDS for embedded systems as car can be a 
vital tool for overcoming the vulnerabilities and shortfalls of the architecture of modern 
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cars. There are two types of IDS, host based and network based. The IDS resides in the 
host device in case of a host based system and the packets which are coming in or going 
out of the device is analysed based on some criteria. The network based IDS resides in a 
central position in the network where it has the ability to monitor any data packets to and 
fro from any of the nodes or devices. There are major two types of techniques the IDS 
uses for detecting intrusion: signature based or anomaly based intrusion detection. Signa-
ture based detection is similar to modern computer anti-virus tools. A set of virus or mal-
ware signatures based on hash values are stored in the databases of the IDS and it matches 
intrusion coming from any of those destinations whose signatures are already in the sys-
tem of the IDS. Anomaly based IDS are smarter, they rely on pattern or behavior of a data 
packet and realize how different it is from a usual data packet of same kind. Both of these 
IDS techniques have limitations, they may have false positives or false negatives. False 
positive is tend to happen when an IDS is considering an event as a threat where in real it 
is not. And a false negative is other way around, an event which was passed by the IDS 
system which in fact is malicious. Christian suggested network based IDS for embedded 
systems to be hybrid IDS system based on some assumptions in his paper. He also men-
tioned the value in using artificial immune systems (AIS) in embedded network as it has 
to be lightweight and consumes less power. There are still much research needed for im-
plementing a proper AIS in embedded IDS in automotive networks. 
 
An applicability analysis of intrusion detection and prevention is automotive systems has 
been done by Fallstrand and Lindstrom (2015). The researcher surveyed the state of the 
art technologies available in modern cars these days and analysed the security measure 
proposed and implemented as well. An evaluation has been done with the current intru-
sion detections and prevention (IDPS) technologies and the researchers tried to portray a 
generic model of IDPS for the automotive industries. The IDPS systems are mostly 
grouped and listed with four properties (Pathan 2014): 
 Scope: What entities and to what extend the IDPS protects. 
 Location and distribution: The location of the system components and how are the 
settings. 
 Detection method: what are the processes of the IDPS to detect intrusion? 
 Post-detection: What will the system do in response of a detected intrusion?  
Several tools and methods have been proposed, among them some are already in use and 
others are still in the testing phase. Among the broad categories there is message cryptog-
raphy, where a CAN Bus packet is encrypted and send in the network. Architectural im-
provements in the vehicle network so that it is more segregated and robust towards attack 
and also securing the endpoint nodes. The purpose of their research was to develop a 
model by constructing a conceptual image of a general in-car network (Fallstrand et al 
2015). The research did an in depth study about the various interconnected components 
of a vehicle and how they are connected.  Additional considerations were taken about the 
hardware-imposed complexity of each nodes in the system and also about the cost. Daniel 
and Viktor proposed that a network-based IDPS system will be viable for automotive 
networks. They also mentioned that a single centralized IDPS system would be a better 
choice however they also talked about the data congestions that it can experience. The 
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team commented that anomaly based IDPS systems such as using a neural networks may 
increase the cost and complexity of the overall system that a traditional signature-based 
IDPS system. The post detection can be either passive or active. The passive detection of 
intrusion in the car will inform the user only whereas the active one will shut down the 
nodes. The authors concluded that it all depends on the criticality of the node itself.  Other 
security measures such as network segmentations, packet filters, and use of cryptography 
was also discussed. The conclusion of this research paper was that, the architectural di-
versity and software/hardware dependencies of different automotive manufacturers is the 
reason for the failure of a generic model of modern automotive systems.       
4.2 Related works on Penetration Testing 
Penetration testing on vehicle ECUs has been discussed by Prathap and Rachumallu 
(2013) in their master's thesis paper. Different types of automotive networks has been 
discussed and attack taxonomy was well explained in context of embedded scenarios. The 
basic concept and principles of information security has been explained in depth, which 
are confidentiality, integrity and availability, which is also known as CIA Triad.   
 
 Confidentiality is the concept that information should only be visible to groups 
who has the right to see the information. Privacy must exist and confidential in-
formation should only be available to intended recipients. As for an example, an 
individual person should only have the access to his health records and someone 
who he has given the permission to view, such as a doctor or health insurance 
personnel.  
 Integrity: The information should not be changed or modified by anyone else ex-
cept the owner or someone who has received the permission from the owner. The 
integrity of an information must be preserved when it is transmitted through a 
network or stored in a media. As for an example, when someone emails a recipi-
ent, the content of the mail should not be altered by anyone in the middle of the 
transmission.  
 Availability: Information should be available at all time whenever the owner 
needs it, else there will be a denial of service scenario. The system must able to 
perform procedures to keep the information available at all times. As for an ex-
ample, a user should always be able to check his email whenever there is internet 
services available.  
Penetration testing is the process of testing the defense of a system, either from the outside 
or inside of the system. This is done to check the robustness of a system to external at-
tacks. The common type of attacks are the external attacks where an attacker tries to in-
filtrate through the attack surface of a vehicle. In internal attack, the attacker already got 
access information to come inside the vehicle’s network through social engineer-
ing.  Some software and hardware countermeasures were suggested by the authors but 
due to the nature of fast paced environment and memory constraints there exist more 




Vyleta (2014) in his master’s thesis Automated penetration testing in automotive industry 
has successfully demonstrate vulnerabilities in automotive network by a method known 
as Fuzzing. Fuzzing is a method which was idealized first by Barton Miller in 1988. The 
idea was to use random data to test in a software or application in order to find bugs in it. 
In this paper the author gave a holistic view of the world of penetration testing both in 
computing and automotive world. He compared the mostly used pen testing standards and 
methodologies and concluded that Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) 
would be a proper choice for pen testing methodology for automotive systems. The author 
also introduced his fuzzing tool called Fuzzer which is based on open source fuzzing 
framework Peach. He proposed a method to analyse the fuzzing results obtained from the 
ECUs.  
4.3 Related works on Standards and Frameworks 
 
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in USA along with the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published a cybersecurity risk 
management framework to modern vehicles in 2014 (McCarthy – Harnett 2014). The 
purposes of publishing this report is to bridge the knowledge gaps between automotive 
industries and cybersecurity practitioners. The current risk and threats are well explained 
and the security best practices are mentioned in the form of guidelines. It was mentioned 
that the SAE International Vehicle Electrical System Security Committee is working to 
identify strategies and techniques to prevent breaches in the automotive network and they 
are developing measures to mitigate those breaches when they happen. NIST already has 
a well-established risk assessment framework security lifecycle. A modified risk man-






Figure 6 NHTSA Risk Management Framework (McCarthy et al 2014) 
   
There are 6 detailed steps in the modified risk management framework for vehicles: 
 
 Assess threat model/used case: This is the step where the threats and risks are 
assessed and used cases are developed to portray the scenarios. The threat sources 
can come from either of this three types 1) threat from cyber or physical attack on 
the vehicle network 2) human errors due to omission and 3) natural or man-made 
disasters.  
 Categorize information system: The federal information processing standards 
(FIPS) 199 / Special Publication (SP) 800-60 discusses this step further. This is 
mainly to categorize the vehicle, its sub-systems as well as the impact of the at-
tack. This categorization is mainly done by the system owner which would be the 
automotive manufacturers. This step will help to align the security controls and 
give them the right and optimum support. 
 Select security control: In this step, the proper security controls are selected based 
on types of vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities are identified and the likelihood of 
occurrence and damage is determined. The impact of the threat is also considered 
along with the risk impact. Finally a risk assessment report is produced who likely 
to have system characterization, threat areas and risk calculations. FIPS 200/SP 
800-30 covers this in great details.     
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 Implement security control: The selected security controls from the previous steps 
are implemented here. The common control are identified and the security con-
trols are selected. Security test and evaluation such as vulnerability assessment 
and/or penetration testing are introduced. SP 800-70 has it covered in depth. 
 Access security controls: In this phase, the risk assessment results are shared with 
the management for review in forms of executive briefings, risk assessment re-
ports or dashboards. The review can either be formal or informal based on the 
organization’s policy.  SP 800-53A covers this in great details. 
 Monitor Security Control: This step is covered in SP 800-137 where the security 
controls are monitored. A risk factor monitoring is conduct as well the updates of 
the risk assessments. A monitoring strategy is developed which will be ongoing 
in nature and reflects the changes made time to time.  
 
The members of the Auto Alliance and Global Automakers have developed a cybersecu-
rity best practice framework based on NIST and other cybersecurity standards and it sup-
posed to be a best practice guide for voluntary automotive cybersecurity operations. The 
document mainly touches on vehicle security by design, risk assessment and manage-
ment, threat detection and protection, incidents response and recovery and collaboration 
and engagement with appropriate third parties (Auto Alliance). On top of that the security 
best practice also includes continued review of existing best practices and also prioritiza-
tion of issues and identify them properly. The rooms for engagement of independent ex-
perts are also discussed as well as the participation of external stakeholders such as after-
market product manufacturers, government agencies or event customers/user of the vehi-
cle industries. They will also organize series of work sessions for engaging the industry 
and its people in order to understand and synchronize the industry best practices among 
each other. A white paper has been written by David Brown et al of Intel Security about 
best practices as well (Brown - Cooper - Gilvarry - Rajan - Tatourian - Venugopalan - 
Wheeler- Zhao 2015). In their paper recommendations for security and privacy in the ear 
of the next-generation car, they have talked about the privacy concerns of users’ data on 
the vehicle network and also the risk and vulnerabilities associated with it. They have 
discussed the distributed security architecture and hardware security services which can 
be used by applications. Hardware security such as trusted execution technology, active 
memory protection and cryptographic accelerations were mentioned as best practices in 
automotive securities. A range of options about software security, network security and 
cloud security were also explained. Supply chain risk management such as authorized 
distribution channels (OEMs and third parties) and continuity of supply plans for spare 
parts in order to maintain the vehicle are also included. Different standards in automotive 




4.4 Related works on Vulnerability Analysis 
   
A Car Hacker’s Manual paperback book has been written and published by Smith (2014) 
of Open Garages which gives an holistic approach of car hacking. The book explains the 
attack surfaces commonly available in modern cars, and the tricks to break into the vehi-
cle. A list of CAN Bus inspection tools are explained in the book as well as the explana-
tion of CAN data findings. External and internal threats are categorised well in this book 
and a bird’s-eye view analysis was presented. The infotainment center of a car is closely 
linked to its internal network. Long range external nodes such as cellular or Wi-Fi can 
have direct access to the infotainment console. This console is associated with the internal 
network of the vehicle or the CAN Bus network. Hence an attacker has privilege to com-
promise the processes in the ECU with a tampered infotainment system. Power glitches 
and clock glitches were explained which can be effective if the attacker has a powerful 
device than the automotive counterparts by affecting the memory’s read and write capa-
bilities. To setup a test based workstation to try car hacking a researcher needs oscillo-
scope, logic analyzer, solder reflow station, OBD-II extension cable and CAN Bus scan 
tools. A list of software were also provided that will support the mentioned hard-
ware.            
 
Side-channel vulnerabilities in automobile network has been discussed by Saeedi and 
Kong (2014). This types of vulnerabilities exist among the cryptographic tools already 
available in automotive systems these days. The two types of side-channel analysis are 
the simple and differential electromagnetic analysis (SEMA and DEMA). The authors 
introduced Fuzzy analysis of side channel information. A differential analysis of 0-set 
and 1-set of the cryptographic signals are taken into considerations. They are then fed 
into a fuzzy engine where based on certain rule matrices, the fuzzy engine concludes if it 
is an improbable, unclear, probable and highly probable incident. The proposed fuzzy 
system works in two phases, in the first phase, the fuzzy engine analyses the side channel 
information and gives a secret bit based on some estimations. Then on the second phase 
a final decision has been made on previous phases output and considering other measure-
ments. (Saeedi et al 2014.)          
 
Koscher, Czeskis, Roesner, Patel and Kohno (2010) did an experimental security analysis 
of the modern automobile. A detail explanation of automobile architecture and the inter-
nal processes are explained here. They pointed out the potential fragility in CAN Bus 
network, in the telematics and also during the operations of the ECUs such as ECU cou-
plings. This paper did not touch threat model of the vehicle in-network but explained in 
detail what hackers can do if they have compromised the vehicle systems through the 
threat models. The two most discussed threat model explained are the OBD-II physical 
port and the various wireless functionalities of the infotainment systems. The experiments 
were carried out on the bench, where there were no wheels attached to the cars, on sta-
tionary cars as well as cars which they are on the road. A software called Carshark has 
been developed to analyse the CAN Bus data and to manipulate with them. The inter-
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vehicle network security is mostly depends on the carrier protocol which is the CAN Bus 
network in most of the modern vehicles. Hence the CAN security challenges such as 
broadcast in nature, fragility to DoS, no authenticator fields and weak access control are 
the main reasons for the easy attack surface in vehicle networks. The attack methodolo-
gies were packet sniffing and targeted probing with the help of Carshark, through fuzzing 
and also through reverse engineering. On the stationary testing, the team were able to 
compromise the radio and control its display. They were also able to control the instru-
ment panel cluster and able to modify data. By reverse engineering they were able to 
compromise the body controller and hence could lock unlock the car doors and jam them 
if needed. Most of the attacks towards the engine were done by fuzzing and through that 
they were able to compromise the brakes, HVAC systems and also be able to generate a 
denial of service attack. On the road testing, the car was moving at a speed of 40 mph 
where the team were able to perform composite attack on the vehicle. They were able to 
control the speedometer, turn off all the lights in the vehicle and also exhibit a self-de-
struct sequence where the engine will be killed after 60 seconds of countdowns.  
The threat models and the attack surfaces has been discussed in another paper by 
Checkoway et al (2011). The paper is titled as Comprehensive Experimental Analyses of 
Automotive Attack Surfaces. The paper was segmented into four sections, threat model 
characterization, vulnerability analysis, threat assessment and synthesis. A comprehen-
sive attack surface capabilities has been constructed, a simplified version is shown below: 











OBD-II Attack hardware plugged di-
rectly into OBD-II port 
Yes Small Yes 
Indirect 
physical 
CD CD-based firmware updates Yes Small Yes 
 CD Special song (WMA) embedded 




 PassThru Wi-Fi or wired control to 
PassThru devices such as cell-
phones or iPods 
No Small Yes 
 PassThru Shell injection via Wi-Fi or 
wired connection 






Buffer overflow via cellphone 
which is paired and has a Trojan 
app 
No Large Yes 
 Blue-
tooth 
MAC address sniffing, PIN 
brute force 




Cellular Authentication exploit, buffer 
overflow by the use of laptop 
No Large Yes 
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 Cellular Call car, authentication exploit 
through iPod, audio files, ear-
phones, and a telephone 
No Large Yes 
    
Paul Carsten et al has discussed and analysed vulnerabilities in in-car network and also 
recommended few solutions in their paper In-vehicle Networks: Attacks, Vulnerabilities, 
and Proposed Solutions. The team had explained different types of communication buses 
available to modern cars such as CAN, FlexRay, MOST and LIN. A detailed analysis of 
standard CAN packet was also mentioned. Different attack methods such as data stealing, 
control override, vehicle degradation and data falsification are also explained in great 
detail. The purpose of their research was to provide some functional solutions of the cur-
rent shortfalls of CAN protocol architecture. Since CAN protocol broadcasts packets to 
all the nodes, there might be no way for a single node to know if a packet comes from a 
legitimate in-car node or a malicious node. By including a hash value with the CAN pack-
ets the researchers think they can overcome the problem. Hash value is a fixed length 
numeric value that represents a data in a unique way (Microsoft Developer Network 
2016). Hash values are generated through hash function that is only one way. The original 
data cannot be replicated from a hash value by going backward. Hash value gives the 
authenticity of a data or CAN packet in our case. The team has decided to use CAN with 
Flexible Data-Rate architecture instead of regular CAN architecture which was proposed 
recently by BOSCH. This protocol has improved features and will be able to carry a hash 
value within a packet. They also proposed a CAN identification number based on vehicle. 
So it should be something similar to a VIN which will identify that a CAN packet belongs 
to a specific car, and not any malicious node.  Their proposed solution will use a universal 
clock in the car and also a hash division. The solution will be beneficial to invasion and 
replay attack resistance.   
A database management system (DMS) was proposed by Schulze et al (2009). The team 
has proposed three systems which are centralized, distributed and hybrid. All the data are 
supposed to pass through a centralized system which will look for anomalies in the sys-
tem. But the centralized system can cause a bottleneck scenarios if it breaks in the oper-
ation at any time. The distributed system strategy is to have multiple DMS throughout the 
in-vehicle network, but it might add much throughput and load to the existing ECUs. The 
hybrid system is the combination of both and may work in a desired manner. An algorithm 
was proposed by Ling and Feng (2012) where a monitoring system monitors the CAN 
packets and changes counters based on a known ID or unknown ID. Another very ambi-
tious approach was proposed by Oguma et al in (Oguma – Yoshioka - Nishikawa - 
Shigetomi - Otsuka - Imai 2008). They proposed an attestation-based security where each 
ECU will go through an attestation and encryption process with the master ECU when 
the car was first started in its manufacturer’s location. A verification process with all the 
other ECUs present in the in-vehicle system will exchange cryptographic keys and a mas-
ter table will be present for the master ECU. When a vehicle is started, the master ECU 
sends two random numbers to all the ECUs in the car. These two numbers are used by the 
other ECUs in hash form to communicate further in the system.    
41 
 
In a technical white paper written by Miller and Valasek (2015), they have introduced the 
steps and tools needed for car hacking. Their research was mainly focused to reduce the 
barrier of other researchers or security personnel to automotive infrastructure and secu-
rity. They explained and showed how to put an ECU on a bench, connect it and experi-
ment with it. The team was able to read the ECU sensors and attack the network with 
CAN message injection. They admit that there are some limitation for trying out these 
hacking methods in actual moving vehicles. But last year the team was able to hack a Jeep 
Cherokee 2014 model without altering it. They explained the whole process in their report 
Remote Exploitation of an Unaltered Passenger vehicle.  The team identified that the re-
mote attack surface for the 2014 Jeep Cherokee are the remote keyless entry, tire pressure 
monitoring system, Bluetooth, radio (FM/AM/Xm), cellular and internet (through apps), 
as most of them use CAN C and CAN IHS communication protocol. They were able to 
jailbreak the Jeep’s infotainment system also known as UConnect and also manage to re-
flash it to get compromised updates. Among all other hacking demonstrated by them, 
compromising the vehicle through cellular system was the most outstanding one. One of 
the researcher was able to put payload into the target vehicle from 10 miles away via the 
Splint cellular network. The team was able to compromise the CAN messages to turn 
signals, lock/unlock doors, alter RPMS, kill engine, disengage brakes, and turn steering 
and able to direct the test Jeep into a ditch.     
4.5 Related works on Information Privacy 
Information privacy is getting a considerable attention in the past decades especially in 
law, public policy, organizational behavior and information systems (Caudill – Murphy 
2000).  The consumers’ privacy has been segmented into three categories (Data privacy: 
what the consumer really thinks 2015): 
1) Data pragmatists: These are the group of consumers who understand the risk of 
data privacy but they are willing to review it in a case-by-case basis. They weigh 
the benefits they receive with a service while exposing their private data. 
2) Data fundamentalists: This group is very concern about their data and they oppose 
to share it for any cost. They are always unwilling to provide personal information 
for any kind of service enhancement. 
3) Data unconcerned: As the name applies, this group of consumers are not concern 
at all about the privacy of their data.   
In a report published by US senator Markey (2015), the security risk and privacy gaps of 
drivers were held focused. A set of questionnaire about data privacy and the measures 
taken are distributed among 16 major automobile manufacturers including BMW, Gen-
eral Motors, Mercedes-Benz, Toyota and Honda. The report discusses about the wide 
range of technologies available in today’s automotive market and also portrays the re-




 The modern cars with wireless technologies in the market, 100% of them possess 
the risk and has the vulnerabilities to hacking or privacy violations. 
 Most of the automotive manufacturers were not able to report past hacking inci-
dence in their product nor has an idea if there were any incident happened. 
 Anti-intrusion practises and procedures for remote access to a vehicle are not re-
liable at all, and most of the automotive manufacturers do not understand the ques-
tion asked by senator Markey. 
 Only two manufacturers out of sixteen replied and admit the capability of real-
time intrusion detection in their vehicle. 
 A large number of data about the vehicle as well as the driver has been collected 
by the automotive manufacturers.         
 Most of the automotive manufacturers collect user and vehicle data and transfer 
them wirelessly to their system or third party systems. The transfer process lacks 
encryption and proper security measures. 
 User and vehicle data are stored for unknown number of time in manufacturers’ 
or third parties’ databases and there is no specific rules on data retentions.   
 Customers are sometimes not aware of the data collections and an explicit aware-
ness is not provided by the manufacturers. There are less or close to none possi-
bilities to opt out from data collections without giving up on valuable services 
such as navigations. 
 
These findings show that there are many possible rooms for intruders or hackers to com-
promise an automotive systems via the manufacturer's lack of understanding of data pri-
vacy and security. There should be standards that mentions about wireless vehicle’s attack 
surfaces and the procedures to mitigate them. There should be security systems validation 
and possible options for penetration testing. There should be rooms for handling real time 
hacking attempts and the drivers should be made explicitly aware of the amount and types 
of data collection done by the manufacturers.     
 
Another concern of data privacy is the rise of “Consumer Capital”. It is said to happen 
when customers do not think personal data is a privacy risk rather than an effective indi-
cation to their preferences for specific commodities (Data privacy: what the consumer 
really thinks 2012). Although most of the concentration is towards e-commerce and dig-
ital marketing, few semantic attempt has been done to control consumers’ privacy in au-
tomotive system. No proven model has been developed or tested that will undergo the 
privacy issues in automobiles. To fill up the gaps, an online survey has been conducted 
and data from 142 respondents who are current automobile users (or will be automobile 
users in near future) have been recorded and analysed. Information privacy is defined as 
“the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, 
and to what extent information about them is communicated to others” (Westin 1967, 7). 
It is the personal freedom and control of own data to share with each other. The earlier 
studies have been done on information privacy in general and Smith et al [54] has devel-
oped a one dimensional global information privacy concern (GIPC) scale. It was a general 
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scale and does not contain any specific dimensions. Hence their further research and ef-
forts in this area has finalized a multidimensional scale called concern for information 
privacy (CFIP). The original CFIP scale has four dimensions which are collection, unau-
thorized secondary use, improper access and errors. Malhotra, Kim, and Agarwal has de-
veloped another scale known as Internet Users’ Information Privacy Concerns (IUIPC). 
The first order of this model has three factors, namely collection, control and awareness 
of privacy practices, they are described in detail below: 
Collection: It is the process of data collections for various users’ privacy concerns. It is 
one of the most important factors and it is known to be the degree of information and data 
collected and possessed by others relative to the value of benefit received. Collection is 
also an important factors of CFIP scale. (Malhotra et al 2004.) 
Control: This is another most important components to reflect IUIPC and it is the control 
of personal information that are made public to the automobile manufacturers or third 
parties. This is the ability given to a user over his or her shared information. Numerous 
studies have shown that people has the tendency to have control over their data. A study 
done by Phelps, Nowak and Ferrell (2000) shows that 84% people wanted to have further 
control over their data in order to limit commercial advertisements. It has been also found 
that people are less worried about data privacy concern when they have the choice to opt-
out from the process (Nowak – Phelps 1995). User’s privacy concern will increase where 
there is a lack of control over their data.  
Awareness of privacy practices: Researcher Foxman and Kilcoyne (1993) reasoned on 
the basis of literature review that information privacy happens only when a person is 
given control over his information he is well informed about the data collections and 
usages. Hence awareness of privacy practices is another important factors in IUIPC scale. 
The awareness factor can also be of two types: interactional and informational justice. 
Interactional justice is the transparency of information during the act of legislation and 
informational justice is the process of information disclosure (Malhotra et al 2004).  
Second-order IUIPC: It has been engaged by Smith et al. (1996) that CFIP is correlated 
to first-order factors and their model exclude the prospect of a second-order factors gov-
erned or lead by the first order factors. However Stewart and Segars (2002) argued on 
that and said “CFIP leads to various subconcerns” and hence is no longer a first-order 
factors, it has the elements of a second order phenomenon. Based on these evidences or 
empirical and studies, Malhotra, Kim, and Agarwal [55] anticipated that their IUIPC scale 
is a second-order factor too. Several problems in structural model has been eliminated by 
the second-order IUIPC. As for an example, confusion between multiple factors and many 
research variable of interest by the researchers are phased out. On top of that, problems 
due to multicollinearity has been eliminated too by using the second-order IUIPC. This 
model is more concise, convenient and empirically justified (Malhotra et al 2004).    A 
summary of the comparison of GIPC, CFIP and IUIPC are given below: 
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Figure 7 Comparison of GIPC, CFIP and IUIPC scale (Malhotra et al 2004) 
         
A Causal Model has been developed by Malhotra and Agarwal (2004) which is based on 
the theory of reasoned action (TRA) and trust-risk framework. The context-Specific fac-
tors in the model are the Trusting Beliefs, Risk Beliefs and Behavioral Intention. Trust 
and risk play a vital role in variety of situations where there is a dependency with uncer-
tain environments. A consumer's’ firm relationship can be deduced from a trust-risk 
model (Wulf – Odekerken-Schroder – Lacobucci 2001).  Trusting belief is the degree to 
which a consumer trust the automotive manufacturers or third parties for taking care and 
protecting his information. On the other hand risk belief is the expectations of loss of 
privacy on consumers’ information by the automotive manufacturers. Behavioral inten-
tions is the tendency of a consumer and his intention to release information to the auto-
motive manufacturers or third parties (Dowling - Staelin 1994). There are few hypotheses 
for the Causal models of second-order IUIPC (Malhotra et al 2004) which were already 
tested and the researchers found them supported to their theory. The hypotheses are little 
bit modified to meet the requirement of this thesis and are given below: 
Hypothesis 1: Automotive users’ information privacy concerns will have a negative effect 
on trusting beliefs. 
Hypothesis 2: Automotive users’ information privacy concerns will have a positive effect 
on risk beliefs. 
Hypothesis 3: Trusting beliefs will have a negative effect on risk beliefs. 
Hypothesis 4: Trusting beliefs will have a positive effect on intention to reveal personal 
information. 
Hypothesis 5: Risk beliefs will have a negative effect on intention to reveal personal in-
formation. 
Hypothesis 6: An automotive manufacturer or third party’s request for more sensitive 
information will have a negative effect on trusting beliefs. 
Hypothesis 7: An automotive manufacturer or third party’s request for more sensitive 
information will have a positive effect on risk beliefs. 
45 
 
Hypothesis 8: An automotive manufacturer or third party’s request for more sensitive 
information will have a negative effect on intention to reveal personal information. 
The Causal model of IUIPC by Malhotra el al (2004) are given below: 
 
Figure 8 Original IUIPC scale model (Malhotra et al 2004) 
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5 RESULT ANALYSIS 
5.1 Information privacy 
 
The survey questions for this thesis have been tailored to fit in the major factors of the 
IUIPC scale (Malhotra et al 2004). Questions has been asked to respondents via Google 
forms and the answers are analysed and observed below: 
 
Control It is a consumer's' right to control and monitor about how their vehicle-
recorded and user-introduced data from the automobile are collected, 
used and shared. Five point linear scale were introduced where 
1=Agree, 2=Partially agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Partially disagree, 5=Disa-
gree 
Controlling personal information is the key part of consumer privacy. 
Five point linear scale were introduced where 1=Agree, 2=Partially 
agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Partially disagree, 5=Disagree 
Awareness Automakers collecting information from the car should disclose the 
way the data are collected, processed and used. Five point linear scale 
were introduced where 1=Agree, 2=Partially agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Par-
tially disagree, 5=Disagree 
There should be a clear and easy way to aware the consumer about 
information disclosure through policies or user manuals. Five point 
linear scale were introduced where 1=Agree, 2=Partially agree, 
3=Neutral, 4=Partially disagree, 5=Disagree 
Collection It bothers me that my car is passing information to the automakers. 
Five point linear scale were introduced where 1=Agree, 2=Partially 
agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Partially disagree, 5=Disagree 
I am not comfortable with giving user-introduced data to automaker or 
third parties. Five point linear scale were introduced where 1=Agree, 
2=Partially agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Partially disagree, 5=Disagree 
I am not comfortable with giving vehicle-recorded data to automaker 
or third parties. Five point linear scale were introduced where 
1=Agree, 2=Partially agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Partially disagree, 5=Disa-
gree 
Errors How important is it to have data encryption during the collection pro-
cess? Five point linear scale were introduced where 1=Very important, 
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Automakers should never sell personal information (e.g. information 
obtained from my car/driving habits) to other companies for promo-
tional activities. Five point linear scale were introduced where 




Automakers or third parties (independent service providers) should 
have a secure way to store data. Five point linear scale were introduced 






On a scale of 1 to 5: To what extend do you trust automakers in terms 
of information privacy? Such as having access to user-introduced data 
(e.g. GPS location) and vehicle-recorded data (e.g. how much brake 
fluid is left). Five point linear scale were introduced where 1=I trust 





It is a consumer's' right to control and monitor about how their vehicle-recorded and 
user-introduced data from the automobile are collected, used and shared. Five point lin-
ear scale were introduced where 1=Agree, 2=Partially agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Partially 
disagree, 5=Disagree 
 
Figure 9 User responses: Question on Control 1 
 
140 responses were recorded where 64.3% agreed to this statement and 17.9% partially 
agreed as well.  
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Controlling personal information is the key part of consumer privacy. Five point linear 
scale were introduced where 1=Agree, 2=Partially agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Partially disa-
gree, 5=Disagree 
 
Figure 10 User responses: Question on Control 2 
 
141 responses were recorded where 73.8% agreed to the statement and 14.2% partially 
agreed as well. Only 7.1% disagree with the statement.  
 
Observation: Although all the hypotheses are mathematically proved to be supported 
in the Causal model (Malhotra el al 2004), our survey results also shows a similar pos-
itive effect on hypothesis 1, 2 and 3 in this case. The privacy concerns of automotive 
users will have a negative effect on trusting beliefs and a positive effect on risk beliefs. 
On top of that, trusting belief will have a negative effect on risk belief. Most of the 
consumers believe that they have the right to control and monitor the data that are 
passed to the automotive manufacturers and third parties through their vehicles. The 
control over their own data is the most important thing they think about information 
privacy. This concern of information passing will definitely increase a negative effect 
on the trust towards the manufacturers. 
 
Awareness: 
Automakers collecting information from the car should disclose the way the data are col-
lected, processed and used. Five point linear scale were introduced where 1=Agree, 




Figure 11 User responses: Question on Awareness 1 
 
141 responses were recorded where 69.5% agreed to the statement and 13.5% partially 
agreed as well. Only 8.5% disagree with the statement.  
 
There should be a clear and easy way to aware the consumer about information disclo-
sure through policies or user manuals. Five point linear scale were introduced where 
1=Agree, 2=Partially agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Partially disagree, 5=Disagree 
 
Figure 12 User responses: Question on Awareness 2 
 
141 responses were recorded where 72.3% agreed to the statement and 15.6% partially 
agreed as well. Only 3.5% disagree with the statement.  
 
Observation: The automotive manufacturers or Automakers should disclose the infor-
mation that are collected from the consumers and there should be a clear and easy way 
to aware the consumers. This will support the hypothesis 4 and 5. If the automakers 
reveal what information they are collecting from the consumers and aware the consum-
ers through a transparent method, then the trusts of the consumers towards the automak-
ers will increase and open the intention to reveal personal information. Consumers 
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might disclose more information as there is transparent data collection method availa-




It bothers me that my car is passing information to the automakers. Five point linear scale 
were introduced where 1=Agree, 2=Partially agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Partially disagree, 
5=Disagree 
 
Figure 13 User responses: Question on Collection 1 
 
138 responses were recorded where 40.6% agreed to the statement and 29.7% partially 
agreed as well. Only 6.5% disagree with the statement.  
 
I am not comfortable with giving user-introduced data to automaker or third parties. Five 
point linear scale were introduced where 1=Agree, 2=Partially agree, 3=Neutral, 
4=Partially disagree, 5=Disagree 
 




138 responses were recorded where 49.3% agreed to the statement and 21.7% partially 
agreed as well. Only 6.5% disagree with the statement.  
 
I am not comfortable with giving vehicle-recorded data to automaker or third parties. 
Five point linear scale were introduced where 1=Agree, 2=Partially agree, 3=Neutral, 
4=Partially disagree, 5=Disagree 
 
Figure 15 User responses: Question on Collection 3 
 
139 responses were recorded where 43.2% agreed to the statement and 25.2% partially 
agreed as well. Only 6.5% disagree with the statement. 
 
Observation: A positive response is recorded from responders that they are not com-
fortable that the car is passing information to the manufacturers and it bothers them. 
They are also not favorable with the fact in giving vehicle recorded or user introduced 
data to manufacturers or third parties. This supports the hypothesis 6 and 7, 8. So a 
request from the automakers or third parties for more sensitive information will de-
crease the trust towards them and hence will have a negative effect on trusting belief. 
The consumers will be more concern about the information privacy and hence their risk 
belief will have a positive impact. Their intention to share information with the au-
tomakers or third parties will be less and hence there will be a negative effect to reveal 
personal information.      
 
Errors: 
How important is it to have data encryption during the collection process? Five point 
linear scale were introduced where 1=Very important, 2=Partially important, 3=Neu-




Figure 16 User responses: Question on Errors 1 
 
139 responses were recorded where 56.8% agreed to the statement and 21.6% partially 
agreed as well. Only 1.4% disagree with the statement. 
 
Observation: The lack of data encryption can have two implications in the CIA triad. 
The lack of confidentiality and the lack of integrity. When data is transmitted without 
encryption, there are number of ways intruders can read that data in plain text and mod-
ify it if needed. Thus data is no longer confidential and there is no integrity in the data 
as well. Most of the respondents agree that data encryption is important or partially 
important and it supports hypothesis 2, 5, 6. The privacy concern will have a positive 
effect on the risk belief of the consumers and risk belief will lead to a negative effect 
on intention to reveal personal information. On top of that, if the automakers ask for 
more information, there will be a negative effect on the trusting belief. 
 
 
Unauthorised personal use: 
Automakers should never sell personal information (e.g. information obtained from my 
car/driving habits) to other companies for promotional activities. Five point linear scale 





Figure 17 User responses: Question on Unauthorised Personal Use 1 
 
138 responses were recorded where 74.6% agreed to the statement and 16.7% partially 
agreed as well. Only 2.9% disagree with the statement. 
 
Observation: Most of the respondents believe that the automakers never sell those col-
lected information to companies for promotional activities. If the automakers do so, 
there will be a privacy concern among the consumers and it will have a negative effects 




Automakers or third parties (independent service providers) should have a secure way to 
store data. Five point linear scale were introduced where 1=Agree, 2=Partially agree, 
3=Neutral, 4=Partially disagree, 5=Disagree 
 




137 responses were recorded where 70.1% agreed to the statement and 19% partially 
agreed as well. Only 2.2% disagree with the statement. 
 
Observation: Most of the consumers also agree that automakers or third parties should 
have a secure way to store data. If data is secure then there will be an increase in trusting 
belief hence the intention of the consumers to reveal personal information will be pos-
itive (hypothesis 5).  
 
Global information privacy concern: 
On a scale of 1 to 5: To what extend do you trust automakers in terms of information 
privacy? Such as having access to user-introduced data (e.g. GPS location) and vehicle-
recorded data (e.g. how much brake fluid is left). Five point linear scale were introduced 
where 1=I trust them and 5= I do not trust them. 
 
Figure 19 User responses: Question on Global information privacy concern 1 
 
140 responses were recorded where 14.3% trust the automaker and 15.7% partially trust 
the automaker as well. 25% respondents were neutral and a combination of 45% (22.9% 
+ 22.1%) respondents do not trust the automakers in terms of information privacy.  
 
Observation: Little less than fifty percent responders do not trust their automakers or 
third parties in terms of information privacy. This supports hypothesis 5 where the risk 
belief will have negative effect on intention to reveal personal information. Also hy-






5.2 Attack surfaces 
 
Automotive attack surfaces have been discussed in depth in the previous chapters. 5-point 
scale questions were asked to the respondents about their regular usages in their cars. The 
results are illustrated below: 
 
How often do you connect your phone via Bluetooth or similar technologies to your car? 
5-point scale where 1=Always, 2=Often, 3=Sometimes, 4=Seldom, 5=Never 
  
 
Figure 20 User responses: Question on usage of Bluetooth 
 
 
140 responses were recorded using Google Forms where 32.9% uses Bluetooth or similar 




How often do you use the following features in your car? TPMS (Tire pressure monitoring 
system). 5-point scale where 1=Always, 2=Often, 3=Sometimes, 4=Seldom, 5=Never 
 
 




Out of 140 responses recorded via the online questionnaire, tire pressure monitoring sys-
tem or TPMS has always been used by 22.1% but almost half of the respondents (39.3 + 
12.1 = 51.4%) seldom or never use it in their cars to check their tire pressure. 
 
   




Figure 22 User responses: Question on usage of In-built GPS/Navigator 
 
 
In built GPS-Navigator has been always used by 18.6% of recorded 140 respondents. 
21.4% often use it and 40% respondents never use it. 12.1% respondents sometimes use 
the technology. It is assumed that they have it installed in their vehicle and use it when 
needed to.  
 
 









138 responses were recorded where more than 70% respondents use their car entertain-
ment system regularly. Only about 18% seldom or never use it. 
 
 
Lane changing assistance / Automatic parallel parking. 5-point scale where 1=Always, 
2=Often, 3=Sometimes, 4=Seldom, 5=Never 
 
 
Figure 24 User responses: Question on usage of Lane changing assistance / Auto-
matic parallel parking 
 
Lane changing assistance and automatic parallel parking are still very new features of-
fered in modern cars and they are mostly installed in the high end or limited models. More 
than 65% respondents out of 138 seldom or never use it. It is assumed that they do not 












Mobile phone integration is the process of connecting the phone via wireless technologies 
(Bluetooth) or wired technologies (3.5mm audio cable, USB cable) to the vehicle’s info-
tainment system in order to use various services. The services can range from playing 
music from the cellphone to sync the cellphone’s user interface (UI) to the vehicle UI. By 
syncing the cellphone to the vehicle, the user can assess phonebook and call someone just 
by using the vehicle’s touchscreen UI. Out of 140 respondents, 33.6% always use this 
technology and 17.1% often use it. About 31% respondents never use this technology to 
sync their phone to the vehicle. 
 
 
What third party devices do you use in your car?  
 
Figure 26 User responses: Question on usage of Third party devices 
 
Of 126 respondents: 
 
Car alarm – used by 54.8%  
GPS tracking – used by 57.9%  
Remote engine shut down – used by 25.4% 
Car diagnosis via OBD-II – used by 29.4% 
Performance monitor – used by 34.1% 
FM modulator – used by 25.4% 
Device to reflect driving behavior (for insurance purposes) – used by 16.7% 
 
 
Observation: Most of the automotive consumers use devices or technologies which 
has an attack surface that can damage their vehicles. A maximum number of respond-
ents use Bluetooth technologies alone or to integrate their cellphones to the cars. It has 
been studied earlier that any of these technologies are fairly hackable and consumers’ 






5.3 Awareness among consumers 
 
Few questions were also asked about the awareness of the consumers about data collec-
tions, privacy and the trend of automotive hacking. They were also asked if there is a tool 
available to enhance automotive security, then which data will they allow to send and 
how much are they willing to pay for that service. 
 
Security information and event management (SIEM) is an IT security approach to an-
alyze logs and data to get a holistic approach of a system. Most of the SIEM systems 
deploy by collecting and analyzing logs from a system and look for anomalies and 
security breaches (Rouse 2015). Intrusion detection systems also fall under the subcat-
egories of SIEM.  
 
 
Did you know that 35% of vehicles already has technologies from manufactures that can 
collect driving history information? Options were Yes or No radio buttons. 
 
 










Figure 28 User responses: Question on awareness 2 
 
 
If there is a SIEM tool available to enhance your automotive security, what data will you 
allow to pass to the provider? 
 
 




A question has been asked to the consumers in the survey about possible money they are 
willing to spend per month to avail a service that can help to minimize automobile hack-
ing and privacy issues. A total of 125 respondents replied in Canadian dollars, Euros, 
Bangladeshi taka and American Dollars. A conversion has been done to baseline all the 
currency to Canadian Dollar and few outliers are eliminated. The outliers that were ex-
cluded from the research are Canadian dollar $500 and $1000 from two respondents. The 
reason they were eliminated from the calculation is it is indeed a huge amount to pay per 





The mean or average of this 123 responses were calculated to be Canadian dollar $20.66 
and the standard deviation is calculated to be 32.36. Although the standard deviation and 
the mean are independent of each other, still the standard deviation is a very large number 
for this data set. The probable explanations are: 
1. Population is not large enough: The 123 responses might be not large enough to 
study this observation. 
2. Privacy perception differs: Privacy perception differs from people to people, with 
age, education level (Madden 2014) and also countries. This was one of the limi-
tations of this online survey of not to include the covariant such as responders age, 
education and country of residence. It can be included in any future work. 
 
Observation: 55% consumers do not know that almost 35% vehicles in road has the 
capabilities to collect driving histories. About half of the respondents know that most 
of these automotive technologies are fairly hackable.  That supports the fact that there 
are lack of awareness about information privacy. There is demand for cybersecurity 






Cars are the primary mode of transportation in most of the developed countries. Its usage 
has been increased as there are variety of models available in the market in respect of 
prices and sizes. With the advancement of technologies and our dependencies on it, al-
most all of the modern cars are technologically suffice. But with great power comes great 
responsibilities (Know Your Meme 2015) and hence those technologies will be misused 
if not guarded well. This research focused on the vulnerabilities, attack surfaces and meth-
ods in modern automobiles and performed a study on it. It also look into the privacy 
aspect of the consumers who are using those vehicles. Online survey was the empirical 
data analysis methods and the data analysis was used to support the two research ques-
tions of this study. 
 
1. What are the attack surfaces and methods in automotive systems and network? 
How many of them are currently used by automotive consumers? (R1) 
2. In which consumer’s privacy scale and/or model do automotive consumer privacy 
falls? (R2) 
 
The first research question R1 asked about the attack surfaces and methods in automotive 
systems and network. It was well explained in chapter three. Survey analysis was con-
ducted to answer the later part of R1. We were able to find an estimation of automotive 
consumers using technologies with wide open attack surfaces. 
 
The second research question R2 was illustrated by matching the internet consumers’ 
privacy IUIPC scale model and check if automotive consumers’ privacy follows the same 
trend as the hypotheses of the IUIPC model. Survey results were used to support the data 
analysis and it is found that the hypotheses are aligned.  
 
6.1 Discussions on hypotheses 
 
A detail analysis on the survey results are illustrated in the previous chapter. Responses 
were recorded via Google Forms and statistical analyses have been performed. This study 
was done based on hypotheses which were stated in chapter 1. The hypotheses are: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Automotive users’ information privacy concerns will have a negative effect 
on trusting beliefs. 
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Hypothesis 2: Automotive users’ information privacy concerns will have a positive effect 
on risk beliefs. 
Hypothesis 3: Trusting beliefs will have a negative effect on risk beliefs. 
According to the survey data analysis there is strong indication that the automotive 
users’ privacy concerns will have a negative effect on trusting beliefs of the users and 
hence this hypothesis is accepted. Since hypothesis 1 is accepted and when the trusting 
beliefs of the users have a negative effect, it automatically gives a positive effect on 
risk beliefs, hence hypothesis 2 is also accepted. Hypothesis 1 implies on hypothesis 2 
which indirectly implies that trusting beliefs will have a negative effect on risk beliefs, 
hence hypothesis 3 is accepted. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Trusting beliefs will have a positive effect on intention to reveal personal 
information. 
Hypothesis 5: Risk beliefs will have a negative effect on intention to reveal personal in-
formation. 
If a user or consumer of automobile trusts their auto manufacturers or third parties, then 
they will reveal personal information to them and hence trusting beliefs will have a 
positive effect and on the other hand risk beliefs will have a negative effect. The survey 
results demonstrated in chapter 5 supports the hypotheses positively and hence hypoth-
esis 4 and 5 are accepted.   
 
Hypothesis 6: An automotive manufacturer or third party’s request for more sensitive 
information will have a negative effect on trusting beliefs. 
Hypothesis 7: An automotive manufacturer or third party’s request for more sensitive 
information will have a positive effect on risk beliefs. 
Hypothesis 8: An automotive manufacturer or third party’s request for more sensitive 
information will have a negative effect on intention to reveal personal information. 
From the data analysis of the survey it has been established that the automotive manu-
factures request for more information to the consumers will have a negative effect on 
trust beliefs and a positive effect on risk belief. That means the consumers will less 
trust the automotive manufacturers and hence the risk will increases among them. It 
also will stop them to have the intention to reveal personal information to the automo-





6.2 Future work 
 
The future work in order to improve this thesis would be to add covariates such as age, 
sex, education and countries while using survey questionnaires. It should also be very 
helpful to have a sample size which is bigger than five hundred respondents so that the 
confidence level will be more and error margins in data collection will be less. Practical 
analysis of some intrusion detection systems or SIEM tools can also be very helpful to 
the research. Tools that are secure in nature and will transmit data from a vehicle in en-
crypted form. Automotive consumers’ awareness can also be studies in greater depth as 
it is one of the primary factors to mitigate intrusions in automotive networks. 
 
This research studied the attack surfaces and methods in automotive networks and 
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